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Abstract : This chapter studies games played on xed networks. These games capture a
wide variety of economic settings including local public goods, peer e¤ects, and technology
adoption. We establish a common analytical framework to study a wide game class. We
unearth new connections between games in the literature and in particular between those
with binary actions, like coordination and best-shot games, and those with continuous
actions and linear best replies. We review and advance existing results by showing how they
tie together within the common framework. We discuss the game-theoretic underpinnings
of key notions including Bonacich centrality, maximal independent sets, and the lowest and
largest eigenvalue. We study the interplay of individual heterogeneity and the network and
we develop a new notion - interdependence - to analyze how a shock to one agent a¤ects
the action of another agent. We outline directions for future research.
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I. Introduction
This chapter studies games played on networks. The games capture a wide variety of eco-
nomic settings, including local public goods, peer e¤ects, and technology adoption. Pair-
wise links can represent, respectively, geographic proximity, peer relations, and industry
ties. The collection of links form a network, and given the network, agents choose actions.
Individual payo¤s derive from own actions and the actions of linked parties. Because sets
of links overlap, ultimately the entire network structure determines equilibrium outcomes.
The chapter develops a guide to study all these settings by nesting the games in a
common framework. Start with local public goods, for example. Individuals choose some
positive level of goods, which benet themselves and their neighbors. Provision is indi-
vidually costly. Playersactions are then strategic substitutes; when a players neighbor
provides more, he provides less. A peer e¤ect game requires just two modications. The
rst is a change in the sign of a parameter, so that playersactions are strategic comple-
ments rather than substitutes. The second is an upper bound on playersactions, since,
for example, students can study no more than twenty-four hours in a day. Next consider
a coordination game, as in technology adoption. Individuals actions are complements;
they want to choose the same action as their neighbors. Here there is one additional
modication restricting individuals to binary actions: adopt technology Aor adopt
technology B. We show that in these games individuals have the same underlying in-
centives expressed in linear best replies, which are more or less constrained. The chapter
systematically introduces the modications changes in parameter sign and/or constraints
on agentschoices and shows how they alter the analysis and a¤ect outcomes.
The chapter has three overarching objectives. The rst is to establish a common ana-
lytical framework to study this wide class of games. So doing, the chapter establishes new
connections between games in the literature particularly the connection between binary
choice games, such as coordination and best shot games, and games with continuous ac-
tions, such as public goods, peer e¤ects, and oligopoly games. The second objective is to
review and advance existing results by showing how they tie together within the common
framework. The nal objective is to outline directions for future research.
All the games considered in this chapter are simultaneous-move, complete information
games.1 The analysis thus employs classic solution concepts: Nash equilibrium and stable
equilibrium, which is a Nash equilibrium robust to small changes in agentsactions.
The chapter studies how equilibrium outcomes relate to features of the network. In any
strategic setting, researchers study the existence, uniqueness and stability and possibly
comparative statics of equilibria. In a network game, researchers strive to answer these
questions in terms of the network: What features of the network determine the Nash and
stable equilibrium set? How do individual network positions determine individual play?
How do outcomes change when links are added to or subtracted from a network?
The chapter reviews known results and highlights open questions. Characterizations
of equilibrium sets often involve conditions on the eigenvalue of the network matrix. It
has been long known, for example, that in a continuous-action game with pure comple-
mentarities, such as peer e¤ects, a contraction property based on the highest eigenvalue
1We discuss network games of incomplete information in Conclusion.
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guarantees the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. The contraction ensures that
the complementarities and network e¤ects are su¢ ciently small so there is a convergence
in the best replies.
In a continuous-action game with any substitutabilities, such as an oligopoly game, it
is the lowest eigenvalue that appears in the equilibrium conditions. For example, a unique
Nash equilibrium exists if the magnitude of the lowest eigenvalue is su¢ ciently small. While
the highest eigenvalue is a positive number, the lowest eigenvalue is a negative number,
and its magnitude captures the extent of substitutabilities in the overall network. When
this condition does not hold, the computation of the Nash and stable equilibrium set is
necessarily complex.
As for individual play, when network e¤ects are su¢ ciently small so that there is a
unique interior equilibrium, individual actions are proportional to playersBonacich cen-
tralities. Little is known, however, about how individual play relates to network position
when the network e¤ects are larger and equilibria involve agents who are constrained in
their best replies.
The chapter further engages a novel question concerning networks and equilibria: how is
one agents action a¤ected by an exogenous shock to another agent? The chapter develops
a new notion: equilibrium interdependence of agents. When one rms production cost is
reduced, for example, it possibly a¤ects equilibrium production of all rms not just the
rms direct competitors. We study whether two players who are not directly connected are
nonetheless interdependent, relating interdependence to changes in individual parameters.
We show that path-connectedness is necessary but not su¢ cient for interdependence. A
third player along the path could absorb the impact of one player on the other. We study
comparative statics and how shocks to individuals propagate or do not propagate through
a network.2
This consideration of individual heterogeneity opens new avenues for investigation.
Individuals are characterized not only by their position in the network but also by individual
costs and benets of actions. This heterogeneity allows the study of interdependence and
allows the connection to the empirical literature on social interaction, equilibria, and the
reection problem. This connection is a rich arena for current and future research and is
discussed below.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II presents the basic simultaneous-move
game on a network and constructs the common set of (linear) best replies. Section III
gives examples of games in the literature that t in the framework. Section IV analyzes
the simplest case unconstrained actions which serves as a foil for the constrained cases
that follow. Sections V and VI study the games where agents actions are continuous but
constrained, rst to be positive, then to be positive and below an upper bound. In Section
VII, we study binary action games. Section VIII relates the theory of network games to
empirical work on social interactions. Section IX discusses related games and topics that
fall outside our framework.
2The chapter by Daron Acemoglu, Asuman Ozdaglar, and Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, in this volume, also
discusses how macroeconomic outcomes are induced by microeconomic shocks under network interactions.
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II. Games on a Network and (Modied) Linear Best Replies
This section introduces the basic game played on a network and identies the key economic
parameters. It then poses the mathematical systems underlying the Nash and stable equi-
libria for the class of games covered in this chapter.
A. Players, Links, and Payo¤s
There are n agents, and N denotes the set of all agents. Agents simultaneously choose
actions; each agent i chooses an xi in Xi  R. Agents are embedded in a xed network
represented by an nXn matrix, or graph, G; where gij 2 R represents a link between
agents i and j. Note that gij can be weighted and positive or negative. For most of the
chapter, links are assumed to be undirected; i.e., gij = gji. In the games below, only the
actions of is neighbors the agents to whom i is linked enter an agent is payo¤ i:
Each agents payo¤ is a function of own action, xi, othersactions, x i, the network,
and a global parameter  2 [ 1; 1], called the payo¤ impact parameter,which gives the
sign and magnitude of the e¤ect of playersactions on their neighbors: i(xi;x i; ;G):
For a given G and , we will say a property holds generically, i.e., for almost any , if it
holds for every  2 [ 1; 1] except for possibly a nite number of values. For any square
matrix M; let min(M) denote the lowest eigenvalue and let max(M) denote the highest
eigenvalue. Note these eigenvalues can always be written in terms of each other; that is,
max( M) =  min(M):
The signs of  and gij determine the type of strategic interactions between i and j.
As we will see, is and js actions are strategic complements when gij < 0; and they are
strategic substitutes when gij > 0.3 We say that a game has pure complements if  < 0
and 8i; j; gij  0 and pure substitutes if  > 0 and 8i; j; gij  0. The literature has paid
much attention to these polar cases, at the risk of neglecting the analysis of the general
case.4 We pay careful attention to this issue in what follows.
B. Best Replies, Nash Equilibria, and Stable Equilibria
We consider pure-strategy Nash equilibria of these games.5 Let
fi(x i; ;G) = arg max
xi
fi(xi;x i; ;G)g (1)
3An agent is action is a strategic complement (substitute) to js action when is best reply is increasing
(decreasing) in js action. See Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).
4For example, with pure complements the Perron-Frobenius Theorem and derivative results (e.g., the
addition of a link increases the largest eigenvalue) apply. But these results do not apply if there are any
substitutabilities.
5For many continuous action games in this class, the payo¤ functions are concave and no mixed strategy
Nash equilibria exist.
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denote agent is best reply to other agentsactions. The following is then the system of
best replies:
x1 = f1(x 1;;G) (2)
...
xn = fn(x n;;G):
A Nash equilibrium is a vector x = (x1; : : : ; xn) that satises this system.
The chapter considers both the full set of Nash equilibria and the subset of Nash
equilibria that are stable. Stable, here, refers to the criterion that an equilibrium is robust
to small changes in agents actions. Appropriate stability notions necessarily di¤er for
continuous and binary action games. For binary actions, we use a notion of stochastic
stability based on asynchronous best-reply dynamics and payo¤s (Blume (1993), Young
(1998)).
For continuous actions, we consider a classic denition of stability which is a continuous
version of textbook Nash tâtonnement.6 Starting with a Nash equilibrium x, and changing
agentsactions by a little bit, we ask whether the best replies lead back to the original
vector. Consider the following system of di¤erential equations:

x1 = f1(x 1;;G)  x1 (3)
...

xn = fn(x n;;G)  xn:
By construction, a vector x is a stationary state of this system if and only if it is a Nash
equilibrium. We say a Nash equilibrium x is asymptotically stable when (3) converges to
x following any small enough perturbation.7
C. Class of Games and Restrictions on the Strategy Space
We consider games whose payo¤s are special cases of the following generalized payo¤ func-
tion:
i(xi;x i; ;G) = vi
 
xi   x0i + 
X
j
gijxj
!
+ wi(x i) (4)
where vi is increasing on ( 1; 0], decreasing on [0;+1) and symmetric around 0; so that
0 is the unique maximum of vi, and wi can take any shape. The individual parameter
x0i represents agent is optimal action absent social interactions ( = 0 and/or gij = 0 ).
A higher x0i would correspond, for example, to is greater personal benet from actions
or lower private cost. As jj increases, the payo¤ externalities of agentsactions become
globally stronger.
6See, e.g., Fisher (1961).
7Formally, following Weibull (1995, Denition 6.5, p.243), introduce B(x; ") =

y 2 Rn+ : jjy   xjj < "
	
and (t;y); the value at time t of the unique solution to the system of di¤erential equations that starts at
y. An equilibrium x is asymptotically stable if 8" > 0, 9 > 0 : 8y 2 B(x; ), 8t  0, (t;y) 2 B(x; ") and
if 9" > 0 : 8y 2 B(x; "), limt!1 (t;y) = x.
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In the base case, actions can take any real value: for each agent i, xi 2 Xi = R. With
payo¤s (4), best replies are linear in other agentsactions:
fi(x i) = x0i   
X
j
gijxj: (5)
The agent essentially compares his autarkic optimum, x0i , to the weighted sum of his
neighborsactions, 
P
j gijxj; his best reply is the di¤erence between the two.
While in principle, a players action could be any real number, all games in the literature
place restrictions on playersactions which represent di¤erent real-world situations. For
example, for peer e¤ects in a classroom, there are natural lower and upper bounds a
student can study no less than zero hours and no more than twenty-four hours in a day.
For technology adoption, an individual is often restricted to two actions: adoptor not
adopt.
For each restriction on the action space, we determine the corresponding best reply.
First, agentsactions are constrained to be non-negative, which corresponds to, for example,
the production of goods or services. For each agent i, xi 2 [0;1) and the corresponding
best reply is
fi(x i) = max
 
0;
 
x0i   
X
j
gijxj
!!
: (6)
Second, agentsactions must not be below zero nor be above some nite upper bound L:
for each agent i, xi 2 Xi = [0; L] with 0 < L <1. The corresponding best reply is
fi(x i) = min
 
max
 
x0i   
X
j
gijxj; 0
!
; L
!
: (7)
In both cases a players best reply is to choose, as much as possible, the di¤erence between
x0i , and the weighted sum 
P
j gijxj.
Finally, agents must choose between two discrete values: xi 2 Xi = fa; bg with a  b.
Agent is best reply can be written in terms of a threshold value ti = x0i   12(a + b). If
the weighted sum of neighborsactions is above the threshold, is best response is a; if the
weighted sum is below the threshold, agent is best response is b; if the sum is equal to the
threshold, i is indi¤erent between a and b. We have:
fi(x i) = a if 
X
j
gijxj > ti; (8)
fi(x i) = b if 
X
j
gijxj < ti;
fi(x i) = fa; bg if 
X
j
gijxj = ti:
The best replies for the constrained actions, (6), (7), and (8), can all be obtained from
(5). Let bxi(x i)  x0i  Pj gijxj denote the unconstrained optimum. When agents choices
are constrained, agent is best reply is simply the value which is closest to bxi(x i) within
the restricted space.
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D. Game Class
The chapter studies all games whose best replies have the above form. Since the best
replies are equivalent, to analyze the equilibria for all games, we can consider one payo¤
function that satises the conditions of (4). We make extensive use of payo¤s with the
following quadratic form:
i(xi;x i; ;G) =  1
2
 
xi   x0i   
X
j
gijxj
!2
+ wi(x i): (9)
III. Examples of Games in the Literature
Many games in the economics and the network literature fall in this class, with di¤erent
specications of the action spaces, Xi, the link values gij; and the payo¤ impact parameter
: All games in the literature involve some restriction on the strategy space.
A. Constrained Continous Actions: Quadratic Payo¤s and Benet/Cost Pay-
o¤s
Quadratic payo¤s are common and have been used to represent a variety of settings in-
cluding peer e¤ects, consumption externalities, and oligopoly. Players choose some action
xi 2 Xi = [0;1) and payo¤s have a form such as
i(xi;x i; ;G) = x0ixi  
1
2
x2i   
X
j
gijxixj; (10)
which is a special case of (9).8 With positive links, gij = gji  0, and negative payo¤
parameter,   0; these payo¤s give a pure complements game, as in peer e¤ects. For
pure substitutes, gij = gji  0, and   0; as in a Cournot game with n rms producing
substitute products. The links gij = gji = 1 indicate rm i and rm j compete directly,
and a function of  is the overall extent of substitutability among goods. Quadratic payo¤s
have also been used to model settings with both substitutes and complements, as in crime
games.9
Another type of payo¤s species the trade-o¤between the benets from own and others
actions and individual costs, as in the private provision of local public goods.10 Each agent
chooses a level xi 2 Xi = [0;1) and earns
i(xi;x i; ;G) = bi(xi + 
X
j
gijxj)  ixi;
8For a prominent example see Ballester, Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2006).
9The benet from xi is higher when the overall crime level is lower, capturing the possibility that
criminals may compete for victims or territory. The cost of xi is lower when is friends engage in more
crime, capturing the possibility of positive peer e¤ects. See Bramoullé, Kranton & DAmours (2014),
which renes Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2004) and Ballester, Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2010)
10Bramoullé & Kranton (2007) study the private provision of local public goods. Further studies include
Galeotti and Goyal (2010) and Allouch (2014).
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where bi() is strictly increasing and strictly concave, i > 0 is is marginal cost, and
b0i(0) > i > b
0
i(+1) for all i. The links are positive, gij = gji  0; and   0 so
that agentspayo¤s increase when their neighbors provide more public goods. Best replies
correspond to (6) for x0i such that b
0
i(x
0
i ) = i. The substitutability of own and others
goods is scaled by :
B. Binary Actions: Coordination, Anti-Coordination, and Best-Shot Games
In many games in the literature, players have the choice between two actions such as buy
vs. not buy,vote yesvs. vote no,etc. For judicious choices of a, b,  and x0i , binary
games played on a network have the form of best reply (8). Consider the payo¤s of a
symmetric 2X2 game with actions A and B:
A B
A AA; AA AB; BA
B BA; AB BB; BB
This matrix gives payo¤s for a classic coordination game between two players when AA >
BA and BB > AB. On a network with all gij  0, a player earns the sum of bilateral
payo¤s: i(xi;x i) =
P
j gij(xi; xj).
11
Agent is best reply has a simple form. Dene pB = (AA  BA)=(AA + BB   AB  
BA), where 0 < pB < 1. Let ki =
P
j gij be the weighted links of agent is neighbors,
and let kiB =
P
j gij(B) be the weighted links of is neighbors who play B: Then i strictly
prefers to play B if and only if the weighted majority of his neighbors play B: kiB > pBki.
To establish the correspondence with (8), assign numbers a and b to actions A and B,
let kiA =
P
j gij(A) be the weighted links of is neighbors who play A, and note thatP
j gijxj = akiA + bkiB = (b   a)kiB + aki. The threshold ti = x0i   12(a + b) is then
constructed by setting x0i =
1
2
(a+ b) + jjki(a+ (b  a)pB) for any  < 0.
More generally, these games include any threshold game of complements as dened in
Jackson (2008, p. 270). The majority gameis thus easily recast as a coordination game
on a network. Agents earn payo¤s when they choose the same action as the majority of
their neighbors. Setting AA = BB = 1 and AB = BA = 0, gives pB = 1=2, which
corresponds to (8). For any  < 0 and for a =  1, b = 1, we have x0i = 0.
For binary choice games with substitutes, such as anti-coordination games, agents want
to di¤erentiate from, rather than conform to, their neighbors. The Hawk-Dove game is
one example, where in the payo¤ matrix above AA < BA and BB < AB.12 Agent i
strictly prefers to play B if and only if a payo¤-weighted minority of his neighbors plays
B: kiB < pBki. A network anti-coordination game then has best responses of the form (8)
by setting x0i =
1
2
(a+ b) + ki(a+ (b  a)pb) for any  > 0.
In the best-shotgame,13 actions are also strategic substitutes and agentsactions can
represent a discrete local public good. Each agent i chooses either 0 or 1, with c 2 (0; 1)
11See Blume (1993, 1995), Ellison (1993), Morris (2000), Young (1998), Jackson & Watts (2002), Goyal
& Vega-Redondo (2005).
12For anticoordination games played on networks see Bramoullé (2007), Bramoullé et al. (2004).
13See Hirshleifer (1983) and Pin & Boncinelli (2012).
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as the individual cost of taking action 1. Agents earn a benet of 1 if any neighbor has
played 1. The best reply is then fi = 1 if
P
j gijxj = 0 and fi = 0 if
P
j gijxj > 0. This
game gives another particular case of (8) with a = 0, b = 1,  = 1 and x0i 2 (12 ; 32).
IV. Unconstrained Actions
When agentsactions are unconstrained, the games can be analyzed with relatively straight-
forward linear algebra. Even so, equilibrium behavior on networks gives rise to rich and
complex patterns. This complexity is amplied by the introduction of constraints, studied
in the next section.
A. Nash and Stable Equilibria
For unconstrained actions, a Nash equilibrium is simply a solution to the system of linear
equations dened by the best replies (5). For Xi = R, the system of best replies is, in
matrix notation,
x(I+G) = x0:
Generically, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. A unique equilibrium exists if
det(I+ G) 6= 0;14 and then the equilibrium actions are determined by
x = (I+G) 1x0: (11)
For convenience, we will label this unique unconstrained equilibrium vector x: This argu-
ment also clearly holds for any directed network.
This equilibrium is asymptotically stable according to the standard conditions for the
stability of a system of linear di¤erential equations, which is here jmin(G)j < 1, which
can also be written jmax( G)j < 1: The stability condition imposes a joint restriction
on the payo¤ impact, ; and the network structure, which jointly give what we call the
network e¤ectsof playersactions. The equilibrium is stable only when these network
e¤ects are small enough. When network e¤ects are strong, the equilibrium is unstable.
Bounds on actions, which also often represent real-world situations, are necessary for the
existence of stable Nash equilibria.
B. Network Position
How do individual network positions a¤ect individual actions? Ballester, Calvó-Armengol
& Zenou (2006) rst establish the connection between equilibrium action and Bonacich
centrality (Bonacich 1987).15 In their model, individuals are homogenous but for their
network position (x0i = x
0 for all i). For a network M and a scalar q such that (I   qM)
14Note that det(I + G) 6= 0 for almost every . The invertibility of (I+G) is a su¢ cient but not
necessary condition for existence of a Nash equilibrium. Continua of equilibrium can exist when I+G is
not invertible.
15The chapter by Yves Zenou in this volume provides further discussion of this connection, and how it
relates to key-player policies.
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is invertible, z(q;M) = (I   qM) 1M1 is the vector of Bonacich centralities. It is easy
to see that equilibrium actions x can be directly written in terms of centralities: x =
x0(I+ G) 11 = x0(1  z( ;G)).
These centralities have an interpretation in terms of paths in the network if jqjmax(M) <
1, so that det(I   qM) 6= 0 and z(q;M) = P+1k=0 qkMk+11. For agent i, zi(q;M); is then
equal to a weighted sum of the number of paths starting from i, where paths of lengths k
are weighted by qk 1. Agentsactions are increasing in centrality under pure complements
and decreasing under pure substitutes.
Figure 1 below illustrates the unique equilibria contrasting pure complements and
pure substitutes on a line with ve agents when x0 = 1. For  =  0:3, agentsactions
are strategic complements. The agent with the highest Bonacich centrality is in the middle
of the line, as the scalar q is positive. This agent, then, has the highest level of play and
agentscentralities and actions decrease moving away from the middle of the line. The
outcome is quite di¤erent for  = 0:3; when agentsactions are strategic substitutes. The
scalar q is now negative, giving positive weight to an agents neighbors, but negative weight
to the neighbors of neighbors. The agent in the middle of the line is not the most central
agent. The intermediate agents are more central, as Bonacich centrality weights go up
and down along network paths. Since the agents on the ends of the line have no other
neighbors and hence no further substitutes for their actions their actions are highest,
which leads to a lower level for the agents in the intermediate positions, which leads to a
higher level for the agent in the middle.
1.66 2.19 2.32 2.19 1.66 0.84 0.55 0.67 0.55 0.84
pure complements pure substitutes
Figure 1. Bonacich Centrality and Equilibrium Actions: Complements vs. Substitutes
The simple relationship between equilibrium actions and Bonacich centrality fails to
hold when individuals are heterogeneous. Yet, Bonacich centrality still a¤ords an intuitive
comparative static. Let x(x0) be the unique equilibrium for a given x0 = (x01; : : : ; x
0
1).
Suppose each agent is autarkic action, x0i ; changes by the same amount s. An increase
could represent, for instance, a policy intervention that lowers all agentsindividual costs.
AgentsBonacich centralities give precisely the change in their equilibrium actions. It is
readily evident that
x(x0 + s1)  x(x0) = s(1  z( ;G)):
C. Interdependence
Equilibrium actions depend on how the network connects di¤erent agents. We say two
agents i and j are interdependent if a (small, exogenous) change in agent js autarkic
action would lead to an adjustment in is action. In x, consider @xi =@x
0
j . Intuitively, x
0
j
9
rst a¤ects xj which then a¤ects the action of js neighbors and then the actions of their
neighbors, etc. Through the network, this change potentially impacts all agents. We have
@xi
@x0j
=

(I+ G) 1

ij
=
+1X
k=0
( )k Gk
ij
;
where the second equality holds if jjmax(G) < 1. The marginal impact of x0j on xi is
equal to a weighted sum of the number of paths from i to j. When G is connected (i.e.,
there is a path from any agent i to any other agent j), @xi =@x
0
j 6= 0 for all i and j and
almost every .16
The direction and magnitude of the interdependence depend on whether actions are
complements or substitutes. Under pure complements ( < 0); all the terms in the innite
sum are non-negative. An increase in x0j leads to an increase in x

j , which leads to an
increase in the actions of js neighbors, which leads to an increase in the actions of their
neighbors, and so on.
Figure 2 illustrates the interdependence of agents in a network that represents connected
communities. For  =  1
4
; and x0 = 1, in the equilibrium x the agents with no connection
to the other community play 5.33 and the two agents connecting the communities play
6.67. The Figure shows the value of the partial derivatives for the play of each agent
following a small positive impact to x0 for the agent to the extreme left of the graph.
This impact ultimately a¤ects the play of all agents in the network. The magnitude
of the interdependence follows directly from the formula for @xi =@x
0
j above. With pure
complements, agents are more (less) interdependent when they are connected by more and
shorter (less and longer) paths.
1.68
0.88
0.88
0.95 0.38
0.19
0.19
0.19
Figure 2. Measures of Interdependence under Complementarities
The situation is more complex under pure substitutes ( > 0). In that case, the even
terms in the innite sum are non-negative, while the odd terms are non-positive. An
increase in x0j leads to an increase in xj, which leads to a decrease in the actions of js
neighbors, which leads to an increase in the actions of their neighbors, and so on with
alternating signs. Generically, the aggregate could be positive or negative.
While there are few results that relate the aggregate impacts under substitutes to the
structure of the network, bipartite graphs serve as a benchmark. Bipartite graphs are the
16In the presence of substitutes, the positive and negative e¤ects could cancel each other completely for
specic values of :
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only networks where direct and indirect e¤ects are all aligned. A graph is bipartite, by
denition, when the agents can be partitioned in two sets U and V such that gij = 0 if
i; j 2 U or i; j 2 V . We can show that a graph is bipartite if and only if the length of
all paths connecting two agents is either even or odd. The length is even when the two
agents belong to the same set (U or V ) and odd when they belong to di¤erent sets. In a
connected bipartite graph, @xi=@x0j > 0 if i and j belong to the same set, and @xi=@x
0
j < 0
if i and j belong to di¤erent sets.17 It would be interesting to try and extend these results
to more elaborate structures and interactions.
V. Tools for Constrained Actions: Potential Function
When playersactions are constrained, as in all economic games, the analysis of the equi-
librium set is more complex. When x0i > 0 for all players and jj is su¢ ciently small, the
constrained and unconstrained equilibrium coincide.18 All players choose actions in the in-
terior of the action space, and the analysis of Section IV applies. However, as jj becomes
larger, network e¤ects become important, and some players will be driven to actions at the
boundaries. The constraints then a¤ect the analysis quite deeply.
To construct and analyze equilibria, we develop the following terminology. Agents who
choose actions which are strictly positive and strictly lower than the upper bound are
called unconstrained. Agents who play 0 or play L are called constrained. A constrained
agent i is strictly constrained if i would remain constrained even with a small change in
neighborsactions. That is, i is strictly constrained if x0i   
P
j gijxj > L when xi = L
and x0i   
P
j gijxj < 0 if xi = 0. For a network G and a subset of agents S, let GS denote
the subgraph that contains only links between the agents in S and xS denote the actions
of agents in S.
A. Potential Function
To analyze these games and solve for the Nash equilibria, we use the theory of potential
games developed by Monderer & Shapley (1996).19 A function '(xi;x i) is a potential
function for a game with payo¤s Vi(xi;x i) if and only if for all xi and x0i and all x i
'(xi;x i)  '(x0i;x i) = Vi(xi;x i)  Vi(x0i;x i) for all i.
A potential function mirrors each agents payo¤ function. Changing actions from xi to x0i,
increases the potential by exactly the same amount as it increases agent is payo¤s. Not
all payo¤ functions Vi(xi;x i) allow for a potential function. Monderer & Shapley (1996)
17See Appendix of Bramoullé, Kranton, and Damours (2011).
18This is the case studied by Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006). In our notation, their
su¢ cient condition for the existence of a unique interior equilibrium is  < 1=(g + max(gC G)), where
g is the value of the strongest substitute link in G (i.e. g = maxij(0; gij)) and C is the complete graph.
19Blume (1993) and Young (1998) introduced potential techniques to the study of discrete network
games. Blume (1993) focuses on lattices, while Young (1998) looks at 2X2 coordination games played on
networks. Bramoullé, Kranton & Damours (2014) rst apply potential techniques to the study of network
games with continuous actions.
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show for (continuous, twice-di¤erentiable) payo¤s Vi, there exists a potential function if
and only if @
2Vi(x)
@xi@xj
=
@2Vj(x)
@xj@xi
for all i 6= j. A key property is that the potential is preserved
when restricting the domain. That is, for any possible choices xi and x0i in an agents
strategy space, the potential increases by exactly the same amount as agent is payo¤s.
B. Best Reply Equivalence and Potential for Quadratic Payo¤s
Since all games in the class have the same best replies, we can analyze the equilibria for
all games in the class by studying the equilibria for one game in the class. Any game with
continuous actions and quadratic payo¤s (9), has a potential function when gij = gji since
@2i
@xi@xj
=  gij = @
2j
@xj@xi
. We can then analyze the Nash equilibria for all the games in the
class using the potential function for quadratic payo¤s (10):
'(xi;x i) =
X
i
(x0ixi  
1
2
x2i ) +
1
2

X
i
X
j
gijxixj
or, in matrix form,
'(x) = (x0)Tx  1
2
xT (I+ G)x:
Since the potential property holds for constrained actions, we can analyze all games with
best replies (6), (7), and (8) with this potential function.
VI. Equilibria in Constrained Continuous Action Games
In this section we analyze the equilibria in games where agentsactions are continuous,
but constrained. We begin with preliminary results relating the maxima of the potential
function to the set of Nash and asymptotically equilibria.
A. The Potential Function, Nash Equilibria, and Asymptotically Stable Equi-
libria
For games with continuous actions, an action vector x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
it solves the rst-order conditions for maximizing the potential on X (Bramoullé, Kranton,
and DAmours (2014)). To see this, consider maximizing the potential function:
max
x
'(x; ;G) s.t. xi 2 Xi for all i, (P)
where Xi = R, Xi = [0;1[ or Xi = [0; L]. The rst order conditions for this problem
mimic each agent is individual best reply.20 Each agent chooses his action in the game as
if he wants to maximize the potential, given other agentsactions. Thus we have:
Lemma 1. With continuous actions, a prole x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if x
satises the rst-order conditions of problem (P).
20'(xi;x i) is strictly concave in each xi; so for any x i a single xi satises the ith Kuhn-Tucker
condition.
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The potential function can also be used to identify asymptotically stable equilibria.
Mathematically, it plays the role of a Lyapunov function for the system of di¤erential
equations. Say that a local maximum is strict if it is the only maximum in some open
neighborhood. Starting from an equilibrium which is a strict local maximum of the poten-
tial and modifying actions slightly, individual adjustments will lead back to the equilibrium.
Locally there is no way to increase the potential, which reects all agentsbest replies. In
contrast, if the equilibrium is not a strict local maximum, but, say, a saddle point, then
modifying agentsactions slightly, there will be a direction in which the potential is in-
creasing and individual reactions lead away from the equilibrium. Formally:
Lemma 2. With continuous actions, a prole x is a stable Nash equilibrium if and only
if x is a strict local maximum of ' over X.
With these tools in hand, we will attack the analysis of the constrained continuous
action games, where Xi = [0;1) for all i or Xi = [0; L] for all i:
B. Existence of Nash Equilibria
For games with a nite upper bound, existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed. First,
by standard results, for Xi = [0; L] the strategy space is compact and convex. Since the
best reply (7) is continuous, existence follows from Brouwers xed point theorem. This
argument holds also for any directed network. Alternatively, since the potential function '
is continuous, it has a global maximum over X, and by Lemma 1 this maximum is a Nash
equilibrium.
With no upper bound, a Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. When Xi = [0;1),
existence depends on whether actions are strategic substitutes or complements and on the
extent of network e¤ects. In a game of pure complements, if jjmax(G) < 1, there exists a
Nash equilibrium that is equivalent to the unconstrained equilibrium x. For jjmax(G) >
1, there is no Nash equilibrium with positive actions. Social interactions feed back into
each other and diverge to innity. With pure substitutes, on the other hand, existence
is guaranteed. An agent will never choose an action that is greater than his autarkic
optimum; i.e., fi(x i)  x0i . We can then assume without loss of generality that actions
are bounded from above by L = maxi x0i and existence follows. All these arguments extend
to directed networks. In general with a mix of complements and substitutes, Bramoullé,
Kranton & Damours (2014) show that if jmin(G)j < 1, a Nash equilibrium exists.21
The literature lacks existence results for larger payo¤ impacts. We conjecture that
existence holds if the substitutes somehow dominate the complements in the strategic mix.
C. Unique vs. Multiple Equilibria
Uniqueness is naturally related to the curvature of the potential function, as shown in
Lemma 1. In particular, when ' is strictly concave, the rst-order conditions of problem
(P) have at most one solution. Thus, for Xi = [0;1), or Xi = [0; L], there is a unique
21Note that jmin(G)j = jjmax(G) under pure complements.
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equilibrium when jmin(G)j < 1, since r2' =  (I + G), and the potential is strictly
concave when I+ G is positive denite (Bramoullé, Kranton & Damours (2014)):
Proposition 1. There is a unique Nash equilibrium if jmin(G)j < 1.
Proposition 1 provides the best known condition valid for all continuous action games in
the class. Researchers have derived stronger results for specic cases. Belhaj, Bramoullé &
Deroian (2014) show that the equilibrium is unique for any game with pure complements.
For pure substitutes and homogeneous agents, Proposition 1s condition is necessary and
su¢ cient for regular graphs (Bramoullé, Kranton and Damours (2014)). When  > 0,
Proposition 1s condition becomes jmin(G)j < 1=. The lowest eigenvalue a negative
number gives a measure of overall substitutabilities in the network. When it is small in
magnitude, the magnitude of the ups and downs in the network is smaller, and there is
only one equilibrium.
Figure 3 below illustrates in a complete bipartite graph for six agents. The lowest
eigenvalue for this network is  3. Hence for  < 1=3, there is a unique Nash equilibrium
where all agents play 1=(1 + 3). For higher , there are three equilibria. One of these
additional equilibria is illustrated, involving all agents on one side of the network playing
action 0 and agents on the other side playing 1. The third equilibrium has the same pattern
but with the play of the sides reversed.
1/(1+3δ) 1/(1+3δ) 1/(1+3δ)
1/(1+3δ)1/(1+3δ)
δ < 1/3
1/(1+3δ)
1/(1+3δ) 1/(1+3δ) 1/(1+3δ)
1/(1+3δ)1/(1+3δ)
1/3 ≤δ <1
1/(1+3δ)
0 0 0
11 1
Figure 3. Unique vs. Multiple Equilibria in a Regular Graph
The special case of local public goods with perfect substitutes and homogeneous agents
( = 1, gij 2 f0; 1g; x0i = x0) yields precise structural results (Bramoullé & Kranton
(2007)). Every maximal independent set of the graph yields a Nash equilibrium. Agents
inside the set choose x0 and all agents outside the set choose 0.22 In any connected graph,
there are multiple equilibria and the number of equilibria can grow exponentially with the
number of agents.
Figure 4 below shows the equilibria in a star for  = 1. The agent in the center con-
stitutes a maximal independent set, and the agents in the periphery constitute a maximal
independent set.
22An independent set of agents is a set such that no agent in the set is linked. A maximal independent
set is an independent set that is not a subset of any other independent set. A maximal independent set
has the property that all agents outside the set are linked to at least one agent in the set.
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Figure 4. Maximal Independent Sets and Equilibria in the Star for  = 1
Our general knowledge of how unique vs. multiple equilibria depend on parameters
and the network is still very fragmented. We conjecture that multiplicity tends to be
higher when jj is greater, when there are more substitutes in the strategic mix, and when
jmin(G)j is greater.
D. Stability and the Lowest Eigenvalue
In light of the large possible number of equilibria, stability is a natural renement. From
Lemma 2, we can show that a stable equilibrium exists for any G and almost any .
Moreover, stability is then related to the local curvature of the potential.
Consider a Nash equilibrium x with unconstrained agents U and all other agents strictly
constrained. Now perturb agentsactions slightly by adding a vector " = ("1; :::; "n) such
that x + " 2 X. When jmin(GU)j < 1 the potential function is strictly concave in xU ,
and the best replies converge back to x. When jmin(GU)j > 1, the potential function is
not concave in xU . Some small perturbation " can lead to large changes in best replies,
and the equilibrium is not stable.
Proposition 2. A Nash equilibrium with unconstrained agents U and all other agents
strictly constrained is stable if and only if jmin(GU)j < 1.
The lowest eigenvalue is key to the set of Nash and stable equilibria. There are only
a few results that relate this eigenvalue to a networks structure.23 Intuitively, the low-
est eigenvalue a negative number gives the extent of substitutabilities in the network.
Overall, jmin(G)j tends to be larger when the network is more two-sided,so that agents
can be subdivided into two sets with few links within the sets but many links between
them. Loosely speaking, an action then reverberates between the two sides. For n agents,
the graph with the highest jmin(G)j is the complete bipartite network with as equal sides
as possible (that is, agents are divided into as equal size sets as possible and all agents in
each set are linked to all agents in the other set, with no links within the sets).
Figure 5 illustrates Proposition 2 in two graphs that highlight the importance of the
lowest eigenvalue. Each network contains six agents, nine links, and three links per agent.
The network on the left is a complete bipartite graph, with lowest eigenvalue of  3. The
network on the right has lowest eigenvalue of  2. Consider in each network perturbing the
play of agent 1 in the lower left corner. In the bipartite graph, this perturbation directly
impacts the three agents on the other side of the network (agents 4, 5 and 6) who must
23See summary in Bramoullé, Kranton, DAmours (2014).
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adjust, leading to adjustments on the other side, and so on. In the prism graph in the right
panel, the perturbation directly impacts three agents (2, 3 and 6), two of whom are linked
to each other (2 and 3). The play of these two agents jointly adjusts to the perturbation,
dampening its e¤ect. In the bipartite graph, the interior Nash equilibrium is stable for
  1=3; for the prism graph, the equilibrium is stable for greater impact parameters
  1=2:
1 2 3
654
|λmin(G)|=3
2 5
61
3 4
|λmin(G)|=2
Figure 5. Stable Equilibria and the Lowest Eigenvalue
Overall, among the multiple Nash equilibria, stable equilibria tend to contain more con-
strained agents. If jmin(G)j > 1, any stable equilibrium involves at least one constrained
agent. More generally, the number of constrained agents in stable equilibria tends to in-
crease when jj and jmin(G)j increase. In addition, with pure substitutes stable equilibria
involve the largest sets of constrained agents among all Nash equilibria.24
At this point, however, we know little about the selection power of stability. Exploratory
simulations show that a large proportion of Nash equilibria is typically unstable. We do not
yet know how this proportion depends on the structure of the netwok. The shape of stable
equilibria and the selection power of stability deserves to be studied more systematically.
E. Individual Network Position and Equilibrium Action
The general knowledge of how individual network positions a¤ect equilibrium actions is
still spotty. While alignment with Bonacich centralities is preserved in some circumstances,
this relationship does not hold generally.25
In the following discussion, we consider homogeneous agents (x0i = x
0 for all i) and study
how the possible nested structure of neighborhoods a¤ects play. Whether an agent i plays
more or less than agent j depends on whether actions are pure substitutes or complements.
In particular, suppose that is neighborhood is nested in js, so that js neighbors are a
superset of is neighbors: 8k 6= i; j, gik  gjk. Then under pure complements, xi  xj in
the unique equilibrium.26 An agent with more neighbors plays a higher action. In contrast,
under pure substitutes and if 8i; j; gij < 1, then xi  xj in any Nash equilibrium. An
24See Proposition 6 in Bramoullé, Kranton & Damours (2014).
25See the example in Section IV.A. in Belhaj, Bramoullé & Deroian (2014).
26See Proposition 4 of Belhaj, Bramoullé & Deroian (2014), which shows that this property holds in any
Nash equilibrium for a broad class of network games with non-linear best-replies.
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agent with more neighbors now plays a lower action. The usefulness of these results, of
course, depends on the structure of the network and the extent to which agents are nested.
Recent theoretical work has drawn attention to a specic class of networks nested
split graphs where any two agentsneighborhoods are always nested.27 On nested split
graphs, action is then weakly increasing in an agents degree (i.e., number of neighbors),
or centrality, under pure complements and weakly decreasing in degree under pure substi-
tutes. Future research could possibly extend these results to more complex structures and
interactions.
F. Interdependence
When actions are unconstrained, all agents are interdependent but constraints on actions
can break this pattern. Strictly constrained agents do not change their actions in response
to small changes in neighborsactions and hence break the chain reaction from a possibly
distant exogenous shock. Depending on the agentspositions in the network, this dam
e¤ect can break interdependence and leave parts of the network without e¤ects on other
parts.
Consider rst pure complements  < 0. In x all direct and indirect e¤ects are aligned,
and @xi=@x0j > 0 for any i and j who are path-connected. With constraints on actions,
the direction of alignment is unchanged,28 but xi may now be una¤ected by x0j , and xi is
only weakly increasing in x0j for any jj. Since agents who reach the upper bound do not
transmit positive shocks, (@xi=@x0j)
+ > 0 if and only if i and j are connected by a path of
unconstrained agents.29 In that case,
(@xi=@x
0
j)
+ =

(I+ GU)
 1
ij
=
+1X
k=0
( )k[GkU ]ij; (12)
and the magnitude of the impact is equal to a weighted sum of the number of these interior
paths. As x0 increases, more agents reach the upper bound and interdependence decreases
on both margins. Fewer agents a¤ect each other, and all the positive pairwise impacts have
lower magnitude.
Figure 6 below illustrates consequences of constraints to the interdependence of agents
in the communities graph under complementarities. The left panel contains the commu-
nities graph shown previously, with the partial derivatives of the impact of play from an
impact to the agent on the far left in the unconstrained equilibrium x. The right panel
shows the magnitudes of the partial derivatives for interdependence in the equilibrium when
agents are constrained to play in the range [0; 6]. The two agents connecting the commu-
nities are strictly constrained, playing 6, and all other agents play 5. A small change in x0
27Konig, Tessone & Zenou (2104) and Baetz (2014) show that nested split graphs emerge as outcomes
of natural network formation processes. Belhaj, Bervoets & Deroian (2014) show that they solve network
design problems. We refer to these papers for precise denitions and further discussions of these networks
properties.
28See Corollary 4 of Belhaj, Bramoullé & Deroian (2014).
29See Proposition 5 in Belhaj, Bramoullé & Deroian (2014). The left and right derivatives of xi with
respect to x0j may di¤er. The argument extends to left-derivatives.
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of the agent to the far left has no impact on the agent in his community with links to the
other community. This agent then blocks the impact from reaching further in the network,
and the agents in the two communities are not interdependent.
1.68
0.88
0.88
0.95 0.38
0.19
0.19
0.19 1.20
0.40
0.40
0 0
0
0
0
Figure 6. Measures of Interdependence: Complements with Unconstrained vs.
Constrained Agents
Substitutes involve a number of complexitites, but the basic idea holds. Consider pure
substitutes ( > 0) and a stable equilibrium x with unconstrained agents U and strictly
constrained agents.30 Now, a necessary condition for (@xi=@x0j)
+ 6= 0 is that i and j are
connected by a path of unconstrained agents, and this condition is generically su¢ cient.
Equation (12) holds.
G. Network Comparative Statics Adding Links
When studying network comparative statics, a natural rst step is to look at the addition
or strengthening of links. That is, consider the equilibria for a network G and compare
them to the equilibria for G0 where 8i; j, gij  g0ij. An increase in gij is in many ways
similar to a simultaneous shock to x0i and x
0
j . Hence we can use insights from the study of
interdependence to determine the e¤ect of the new or stronger link.
As with interdependence, the e¤ect depends on substitutes vs. complements. Under
pure complements, the action of every agent in G0 is greater than or equal to the action in
G.31 The action of an agent k is a¤ected by gij if and only if there is a path of unconstrained
agents connecting k with i or j. Under pure substitutes, the comparative statics are more
complex. We do not know how to sign the e¤ects at the individual level and equilibrium
multiplicity further aggravates the issue.
The potential function, however, gives some traction on the problem, at least for ag-
gregate outcomes. When  > 0, the potential is higher in G for any vector of actions:
'(x;G0)  '(x;G) 8x. In addition, '(x;G) = 1
2
(x0)Tx for any equilibrium x. Thus the
largest
P
i x
0
ixi in equilibrium decreases weakly following an expansion of the network.
32
In this sense, the direct and indirect negative impacts of the new link dominate the indirect
positive e¤ects.
30These conditions ensure the existence of stable equilibrium with same set of unconstrained agents
following a small enough increase in x0.
31See Corollary 4 of Belhaj, Bramoullé & Deroian (2014).
32See Bramoullé, Kranton, and Damours (2014). Theorem 2 in Ballester, Calvó-Armengol & Zenou
(2006) is a special case.
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VII. Binary Action / Threshold Games
This section studies binary action games and shows how the common framework advanced
in this chapter can make progress on questions of existence, uniqueness, and stability of
equilibria. A full-edged analysis is a ripe topic for future research. For ease of exposition
in this section, we set the two actions to a =  1 and b = 1, so X = f 1; 1gn:
A. Existence
While existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is not guaranteed a priori, we nd existence
follows naturally from the potential formulation in Section V.A. Since the potential prop-
erty is preserved on a constrained domain, the maxima of the potential function within the
constrained space are Nash equilibria. Thus we can state the following new result:
Proposition 3. In any network where gij = gji and agents play a game with best replies
(8), there exists a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
The existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not extend to directed networks,
except in the special case of pure complements. When agents always desire to take the
same actions as their neighbors, existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is implied by
standard results of the theory of supermodular games. However, for directed networks
and a strategic mix there is no guarantee, as in Jacksons (2008, p. 271) fashiongame
where some agents desire to di¤erentiate from neighbors, and there is no pure strategy
equilibrium.
B. Unique vs. Multiple Equilibria
For binary action games, strict concavity of the potential function does not guarantee a
unique equilibrium. With the constraints on the action space, there can be more than one
vector that maximizes a strictly concave potential subject to the constraints.
We can construct, however, a su¢ cient condition for a unique equilibrium that depends
on the network structure. When each agent has a dominant strategy, there is a unique
equilibrium, and whether each agent has a dominant strategy, in turn, depends on the
impact parameter  and each agents degree. For pure complements ( < 0), an agent
with x0i > 0 strictly prefers to play 1 no matter what his neighbors choose if and only if
jjki < x0i . Similarly, playing  1 is strictly dominant for an agent with x0i < 0 if and only
if x0i <  jjki. An agent with x0i = 0 is a priori indi¤erent and hence does not have a
strictly dominant strategy. Similar conditions hold for pure substitutes. We thus have:
Proposition 4. Consider pure substitutes or pure complements. A binary action game
has a unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies if and only if
jj < min
i
 jx0i j
ki

:
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Uniqueness in binary games then generally depends on the heterogeneity of agents and the
distribution of idiosyncratic preferences.
This uniqueness condition bears a similarity to the conditions for continuous action
games in that there is a unique equilibrium in binary action games when payo¤ impacts
are small enough. With continuous actions, a small enough jj guarantees dampened
adjustments to others play. With binary actions, a small enough jj guarantees that
idiosyncratic preferences dominate social interactions altogether, and agents never adjust
to their neighbors.
While small payo¤ impacts guarantee unique equilibria, large impacts generally lead
to multiple equilibria. Consider jj  maxi

jx0i j
ki

. Under pure complements, all agents
choosing  1 and all agents choosing 1 are both Nash equilibria. Social interactions com-
pletely swamp any idiosyncratic preferences, and full coordination occurs if and only if
jj  maxi

jx0i j
ki

: Under pure substitutes, equilibria involve agents playing di¤erent ac-
tions. But full anticoordination is impossible as soon as the network has a triangle; two
connected agents then must play the same action. It is not possible for three agents to
play di¤erent actions when only two actions are available.
For particular binary games with large payo¤ impacts, Nash equilibria have an intuitive
graph-theoretic characterization. An action prole is a Nash equilibrium of the best-shot
game if and only if the set of contributors is a maximal independent set of the graph (see
Section VI). Each contributor is connected to agents who free-ride on his contribution.33
This result implies that in the best shot game any connected network has multiple equilibria
and, moreover, the number of equilibria may increase exponentially with n (Bramoullé &
Kranton (2007)).
C. Stability
To rene the set of Nash equilibria, we can invoke a notion of stability. As noted above,
asymptotic stability dened by the system of di¤erential equations (3) does not apply to
discrete action spaces. For binary choice games, we use asynchronous best-reply dynamics
to study stability. For asynchronous best-reply dynamics subject to log-linear trembles,
proles that globally maximize the potential are the stochastically stable outcomes for all
potential games (Blume (1993) and Young (1998)).34 This stability notion depends on the
specic payo¤s of each game.35
In what follows, we provide a rst discussion of stability in a binary game where agents
have quadratic payo¤s (9). Let gij 2 f0; 1g. Simple computations show that the potential
33The relation between Nash equilibria and maximal independent sets also appears when agents play
games of anti-coordination on the network and one action has a much higher relative payo¤ than the other,
see Bramoullé (2007).
34In the literature, researchers have analyzed stochastic stability in coordination games (Blume (1993),
Young (1998), Jackson & Watts (2002)) anticoordination games (Bramoullé (2007)) and the best-shot
game (Boncinelli & Pin (2012)).
35Hence, while all games with best replies (8) have the same Nash equilibria, the stochastically stable
equilibrium sets could diverge.
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function is then
'(x) =
X
xi=b
x0i  
X
xi=a
x0i   (naa + nbb   nab) 
1
2
n
where naa is number links between a-players and similarly for nab and nbb.
Consider pure complements ( < 0). Since naa + nbb + nab = jGj, i.e., the number of
links in the graph, the potential is
'(x) =
X
xi=b
x0i  
X
xi=a
x0i + 2jj(naa + nbb)  jjjGj  
1
2
n:
This potential combines two forces. On one hand, ' is greater when individuals play the
action for which they have some intrinsic preference: b for x0i > 0 and a for x
0
i < 0. On the
other hand, ' is greater when there are more links between agents playing the same action.
These two forces can be aligned. When all individuals intrinsically prefer the same action,
full coordination on this action is the unique stable equilibrium. In general, however, a
stable equilibrium can involve coordination on di¤erent actions in di¤erent parts of the
network.
Next consider strategic substitutes ( > 0). The potential is then
'(x) =
X
xi=b
x0i  
X
xi=a
x0i + 2nab   jGj  
1
2
n:
Here ' is greater when there are more links between agents playing di¤erent actions. The
two forces are aligned only in the special case when no link connects two agents who prefer
the same action, in which case the network is bipartite. The prole where every agent
plays his preferred action is then the unique stable equilibrium.
D. Interdependence
With binary actions, in equilibrium agents are not typically indi¤erent between the two
actions, and small changes in individual parameters do not lead to a change in play. We
then consider larger changes, and show changes in individual parameters only have impact
on own play and play of others in critical congurations where what we call switching
cascades can occur.
To illustrate, consider a pure complements game where gij 2 f0; 1g and  =  1.
Consider one of the extremal equilibria either an equilibrium where most agents play 1 or
one where most agents play  1. Consider an initial change from a situation where x0j  0
and j plays  1 to the situation where x0j  0 and j plays 1. When does this change in
js preferences and action a¤ect the play of an agent i? A clear necessary condition is a
path of agents playing  1 connecting i to j in the initial equilibrium. As with bounded
agents in Section VI, agents playing 1 cannot transmit positive shocks. If there is an agent
playing 1 on all paths between i and j, xi is una¤ected by the change in x0j .
Unlike in Section VI, however, this condition is typically not su¢ cient. Agents playing
 1 might not change their actions if some of their neighbors switch to 1. Changing actions
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depends on idiosyncratic preferences and on the number of switching neighbors. Overall,
we observe that interdependence displays a non-monotonic pattern. When x0 j is low,
agents have a strong preference for playing  1 and an increase on x0j does not propagate.
When x0 j is high, an increase in x
0
j also has no impact because agents playing 1 block the
transmission of shocks. The increase in x0j eventually a¤ects xi only when x
0
 j takes some
critical intermediate value. In future research, it would be interesting to understand more
deeply how shocks propagate in binary action games.
VIII. Econometrics of Social Interactions
In this section, we connect the above theory to the empirical analysis of social interactions.
The connections provide econometric models a precise game-theoretic microfoundation and
set the stage for estimation of equilibria. Social scientists have long been trying to assess
the importance of social interactions for outcomes as diverse as academic performance,
welfare participation, smoking, obesity, and delinquent behavior.36 In a typical regression,
researchers try to estimate the impact of peersoutcomes
P
j gijxj on individual outcome
xi. Because individual and peersoutcomes are determined at the same time, regressions
dene a set of simultaneous equations. This econometric system of equations is formally
equivalent to the system of equations characterizing Nash equilibria with best replies (5),
(6), (7), or (8).
Simultaneity raises two main econometric challenges: multiplicity and endogeneity.
First, the econometric system may have multiple solutions.37 Second, the variable
P
j gijxj
on the right hand side of the regressions is endogenous. To address these challenges, ap-
plied researchers must determine the reduced form of the system of simultaneous equations.
That is, they must understand how outcomes x depend on parameters, observables, and
unobservables. Formally, determining the reduced-form is equivalent to solving for the
Nash equilibria of a network game.38
When the outcome is continuous and unbounded, a standard econometric model of peer
e¤ects is: xi = x0i +
P
j gijxj+"i where  is a key parameter to be estimated, usually called
the endogenous peer e¤ect,"i is an error term, and x0i depends on individual and peers
covariates. We know from Section IV that this system generically has a unique solution.
The reduced-form is then given by x = (I  G) 1(x0 + "), and this equation provides the
basis of many empirical analysis of social and spatial e¤ects.39
However, most outcomes of interest (academic performance, etc.) are naturally bounded.
These bounds are neglected in the previous approach and, in fact, in most studies of peer
36See the chapters by Vincent Boucher and Bernard Fortin, by Sinan Aral, by Emily Breza, and by Lori
Beaman in this handbook.
37A related issue is that the system may not have any solution.
38In the literature, researchers have also considered games of incomplete information when agents do not
know the outcomes and error terms of others (Brocke & Durlauf (2001), Lee, Li & Lin (2014), Blume et al.
(2014)). Interestingly, the information structure has little impact on the analysis of continuous unbounded
outcomes but deeply modies the econometrics of binary actions.
39See for example Case (1991), Bramoullé, Djebbari & Fortin (2009), Lee (2007), and Anselins (2000)
review.
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e¤ects, which can yield biased estimates. A truncated version of the previous model,
xi = min(max(0; x
0
i + 
X
j
gijxj + "i); L);
is a way to incorporate bounds on continuous actions. As for binary outcomes, a direct
extension of classical discrete choice models is:
x^i = x
0
i + 
X
j
gijxj + "i
with xi = 1 if x^i  0 and xi =  1 otherwise (Koreman & Soetevent (2007)). These
correspond to best reply (8).
The techniques and results presented in this chapter can then be combined with classical
methods to estimate models with multiple equilibria. The researcher could, for instance,
assume that all equilibria are equally likely (Koreman & Soetevent (2007)); consider a
exible selection mechanism (Bajari, Hong & Ryan (2010)); build a likelihood from some
evolutionary process (Nakajima (2007)); or derive informative bounds from dominance
relations (Tamer (2003)).
IX. Conclusion
This chapter presents a formal framework and technical tools to analyze a broad class of
network games. These games all share the same underlying incentives linear best replies
with successive constraints on agentschoices. The chapter makes new connections between
continuous action games and binary action games that share the same basic structure. We
conclude here by reiterating future research directions and by connecting the analysis in
this chapter to studies of games outside our class.
While much progress has been made on the network features that yield unique and
stable equilibria, many interesting issues are still little understood. The following are some
areas for future research mentioned above: (i) existence of equilibria when network e¤ects
are large, (ii) the relationship between network structure and equilibrium multiplicity, (iii)
comparative statics on the network in the presence of substitutes, (iv) interdependence in
binary action games, and (v) the implications of our framework for the analysis of network
games with discrete action spaces.
The research discussed below considers successively further departures from the as-
sumptions that characterize the class of games covered by our framework.
Directed networks. In general, the analysis does not cover directed networks (gij 6=
gji) since an exact potential function does not exist. The analysis does extend, however,
in at least three cases. First, a game has a weightedpotential when there are scalars i
such that 8i; j; igij = jgji, and most results hold.40 In particular, it is easy to extend the
model to situations with undirected links and individual-specic i. Second when network
e¤ects are small, we can apply the theory of concave games developed by Rosen (1965) and
40See Monderer & Shapley (1996) and Section VI.B. in Bramoullé, Kranton & Damours (2014).
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obtain the following generalization of Proposition 1. For any network G, the games with
continuous actions have a unique Nash equilibrium if jmin((G + GT )=2)j < 1. Third,
Belhaj & Deroian (2013) identify a balance condition under which the comparative statics
on aggregate actions presented in Section VI generalizes to directed networks.
Non-linear best replies. In our framework, underlying best replies are linear and
constraints add complexity. Researchers have started to analyze games with broader forms
of non-linearities. Allouch (2014) studies the private provision of local public goods, com-
bining the frameworks of Bergstrom, Blume & Varian (1986) and Bramoullé & Kranton
(2007). With pure substitutes ( > 0), Proposition 1 and the key role of the lowest eigen-
value extend to a wide class of non-linear best replies. The analysis does not consider,
however, large network e¤ects.
Researchers have also applied results from supermodular games to network games with
pure complements. Belhaj & Deroian (2010) consider payo¤s with indirect network e¤ects
and some specic symmetric networks. They show that action is aligned with Bonacich
centrality in the highest and lowest equilibria on the line, but not on intermediate equilibria.
Belhaj, Bramoullé & Deroian (2014) analyze network games with continuous, bounded
actions, pure complements, and non-linear best replies. They derive a novel uniqueness
condition and study interdependence.
Multidimensional strategies. In the games mentioned thus far, players choose a
single number. In some contexts, playersactions are naturally multidimensional. A rm
could choose both quality and quantity of a good, for example. Individuals can adopt dif-
ferent technologies to interact with di¤erent people. Bourlès & Bramoullé (2014) advance
a model of altruism in networks, where players care about the utility of their neighbors and
can transfer money to each other. An individual strategy species a prole of transfers.
In recent research on conict and networks, agents may also allocate di¤erent levels of re-
sources to conicts with di¤erent neighbors.41 More generally, multidimensional strategies
emerge when players can play di¤erent actions with di¤erent neighbors. Little research has
been conducted to date on such games.
Incomplete information. The papers discussed so far analyze games of complete
information, where payo¤s and the network structure are common knowledge. In the games
studied in this chapter, however, the best replies and convergence to a Nash equilibrium do
not require that agents know the whole network or what all agents play. Agents respond
simply to the play of their neighbors. In some contexts, however, these assumptions may
be inappropriate. Agents may not have complete local information, or changes in the
network may prevent convergence. Agents may then face residual uncertainty on others
connections when taking their actions. Actions would then depend on playersbeliefs about
their own and neighborspositions and actions. Galeotti et al. (2010) study such network
games of incomplete information.42
Network formation. In the games studied in this chapter, networks are xed. In
reality, networks evolve, possibly in a way that can be inuenced by actions. Researchers
have analyzed the joint determination of actions and links for many of the network games
discussed in this chapter, as elaborated in Fernando Vega-Redondos chapter in this volume.
41See Franke and Ozturke (2009), Huremovic (2014) and Sanjeev Goyals chapter in this volume.
42The literature on these games is reviewed in Jackson & Zenou (2014).
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This work includes: coordination games (Jackson & Watts (2002), Goyal & Vega-Redondo
(2005)); anticoordination games (Bramoullé et al. (2004)); public goods in networks (Gale-
otti & Goyal (2010)); and games with quadratic payo¤s and continuous actions (Cabrales,
Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2011)). A broad conclusion of this literature is that endogeniz-
ing the network can lead to fewer possible outcomes, as equilibrium networks tend to have
specic shapes. Thus far researchers generally assume that the payo¤s from the actions
constitute the only incentive for network formation. In reality, people form friendships or
other links for a variety of reasons, and there could be possible multiple costs and benets
from making and breaking links. Future research could engage these more challenging but
potentially fruitful avenues.
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